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impact on civilian killings, namely that it lowers civilian killings. The key factor seems to be strength of
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Robust Peacekeeping?
Panacea for Human Rights Violations
Kofi Nsia-Pepra

Abstract
This paper examines the conviction that robust peacekeeping—a strong and forceful
peacekeeping force—works better than traditional UN peacekeeping mechanisms in
reducing human rights violations, specifically, civilian killing, in areas of deployment. I
seek to analyze both the operational and internal characteristics of UN peacekeeping
operations in an effort to understand the hindrances to achieving the objective of
protecting human rights. Specifically, the study examines the contributions of key
structural variables, including the mission type, weapon type, rules of engagement,
mission strength, and major power participation controlling for other intervening
variables using negative binomial and logit regression models. The empirical results
indicated that the core variable ―robust peacekeeping‖ has impact on civilian killings,
namely that it lowers civilian killings. The key factor seems to be strength of mission size
associated with lower numbers of civilian killings. Great power participation,
peacekeeper diversity and affinity with the host state, along with identity conflicts and at
least proto-democratic status of the host state appear to be harbingers of potentially
higher deliberate civilian killing totals. The findings thus have both theoretical and
policy implications in the field of peacekeeping.
Introduction
The failures of the United Nations to stave off intentional civilian killings in
Rwanda and Bosnia prompted fundamental reassessment of the continued relevance of
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traditional peacekeeping (Griffin 2001, 150) and the adoption of robust peacekeeping—a
strong and forceful peacekeeping force (Brahimi Report 2000)—as a better mechanism to
stave off intentional civilian killing (Lacey 2005, 1). This study examines whether robust
peacekeeping works better than traditional peacekeeping in reducing human rights
violations, specifically intentional civilian killing, in areas of deployment. In this study, I
examine the contributions of key structural variables, including mission type, weapon
type, rules of engagement, mission strength, and major power participation, controlling
for other intervening variables such as regime type, conflict type, borders, peace
agreements, troops composition, and ethnic affinity using negative binomial and logit
regression models. The questions being investigated are: (1) is robust peacekeeping more
likely than traditional peacekeeping to be successful in reducing intentional civilian
killings? (2) do mission characteristics of UN Peacekeeping matter for reducing the
ongoing intentional civilian killing?(3) to what extent does robust peacekeeping affect the
number of intentional civilian killings? The study will allow policy and theoretical
conclusions about these factors in an attempt to realize the cherished objective of
protecting civilians in civil conflict zones.
From Traditional Peacekeeping to Robust Peacekeeping
Problems in Traditional Peacekeeping
The Cold War period missions were characteristically termed ―
traditional‖ and
―
first generation‖ peacekeeping, involving lightly armed UN military observers or
interposition peacekeeping forces, deployed after the cessation of an inter-state conflict to
oversee and assist with the implementation of peace agreements. Missions were limited
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to interdiction between conflict parties and did not generally allow for assertive missions
(Goulding 1993).
Traditional peacekeeping missions were originally designed for inter-state
conflicts but were adapted to contain domestic conflict situations, first in the tragedy of
the Congo in the 1960s (Goulding 1993). They are premised on cooperation of
conflicting parties and the methods used are inherently peaceful. Weak force strength,
limited resources, small arms, no major power participation and rules of engagement that
permit them to use force only in self-defense characterize them. Traditional peacekeeping
missions are non-coercive and the troops are not designed to restore order or stop fighting
between the belligerents unlike robust and peace enforcement missions. Traditional
missions therefore lack both the offensive mission and the capacity to prevent intentional
civilian killings as evidenced in the UN‘s failures in Rwanda and Bosnia.
Demands for Robust Peacekeeping
Ong Heng (2003) defines robustness as having a ―
force that has the credibility to
deter those who mean harm with power to take the necessary actions, including the use of
force, to defend itself and fulfill its mandate‖ (UN Press Release, GA/SPD/268, 2003).
The demand for a paradigmic shift from traditional to robust peacekeeping was facilitated
by the development of humanitarian posture within international peace and political/legal
discourse to capture the mood of contemporary security realities (Dale 2005).
Former Secretary General Kofi Annan outlined the shift to ―
robust peacekeeping‖
when he recommended that the UN should abandon outdated concepts of neutral
peacekeeping and replace them with a more muscular form of peace operation if it is to
avoid the kind of fiascos in previous missions (Ramo 2000). He acknowledged the
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challenges posed by spoilers in the fulfillment of mission mandates and recommended
that UN peacekeepers be equipped and given robust mandates to withstand these
challenges (UN Press Release, SG/SM/9311 SC/8096 PKO/107).
Theoretical Argument and Hypotheses
Robust peacekeeping was initiated in response to the contemporary turbulent civil
war environment, where civilians have become the primary targets. The post cold war era
was proliferated by civil wars along national, religious and ethnic fault lines involving
both state and non-state actors with disastrous and lethal consequences for millions of
civilians (Burk 2000). The difficulties and threats in the operational environment raised
doubts about the suitability of traditional peacekeeping in resolving these types of
conflict (Mockaitas 1999). This precipitated demands for a paradigm shift from
traditional to robust peacekeeping to meet the challenges posed by the changed conflict
environment.
Ruggie (1993) observes a doctrinal void, referred to as the ―
grey areas,‖ between
traditional peacekeeping authorized under Chapter ―
six and half‖ and peace enforcement
authorized under Chapter seven of the UN Charter that needs to be bridged. Ruggie
argues that ―th
e UN has entered a domain of military activity—a vaguely defined noman‘s land lying somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and enforcement, called
the grey area, for which it lacks any guiding operational concepts‖ (Ruggie 1993, 23).
rey area‖ because the
Ruggie further observes that the UN finds itself in trouble in this ―g
UN is wrongly applying perfect traditional tools to ―
inappropriate circumstances‖
(Ruggie 1993, 29). Jacobsen (2000) observed that the basic thrust of robust peacekeeping
is therefore to fill the doctrinal gap identified by Ruggie by deploying deterrent forces in
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conflict zones with wider use of force than in traditional peacekeeping but short of war as
in enforcement (Jacobsen 2000; also see Woodhouse 1999). The presumption is that
robust peacekeeping with its deterrent posture may prevent human rights violations bred
by violence and establish minimal compliance with human rights in a state where the rule
of law has broken down.
Hypothesis 1:

Robust peacekeeping missions will be more successful than traditional
ones in situations where parties are not yet in stable ceasefire or where
rejectionists have organized spoiler opposition to agreements.

Diehl (1994) argues that peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when
peacekeeping forces maintain neutrality, have the consent of warring parties, and use
their weapons only in self-defense. In robust missions, however, the rules of engagement
transcend the traditional notion of self-defense to include the use of force to deter and
respond to spoilers‘ threat and protect civilians (United States Dept. of State,
Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations, 1994). The basic
presumption of the use of deterrent force to restore stability is that hostilities harden
bargaining positions and attitudes rather than concessions by parties who suffer costs
(Greg and Diehl 2005). Until violence is stopped or at least managed, it is unlikely that
any attempts to resolve competing interests underlying the conflict can be resolved. The
presence of a credible military force deters, denies, neutralizes and convinces spoilers
that violence will not succeed (Ruggie 1993).
Hypothesis 1 a:

Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed if the rules of
engagement permit them to use force to protect civilians from
human rights violations.

A fundamental condition for success of robust and all peacekeeping missions is
the provision of sufficient resources including funds, weapons and especially troops.
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Successful missions require resource/mandate compatibility (Malaquias 1996; Bratt
1997). There was a huge resource/mandate discrepancy in Rwandan mission that
disabled United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) from stopping the
genocide. A well equipped large force with appropriate rules of engagement could have
staved off the Rwandan genocide.
Hypothesis 1 b: The larger/stronger the peacekeeping force, the more likely it will be
Successful.
Diehl (1994) argues that peacekeeping is more likely to succeed when
peacekeeping mission forces are lightly armed, and use their weapons only in selfdefense. In robust peacekeeping, however, the conception of peacekeeping has broadened
from the earlier conception of lightly armed neutral UN peacekeeper to much more
activist orientations using heavy combative weapons to hunt down spoilers. Not only do
heavy weapons make them combat-ready but also they are thought to deter spoilers
through the show of credible force. Secretary General Annan acknowledged the need to
rethink how we equip troops and prepare them for all eventualities (United Nations Peace
Operations A/55/305/2000/809).
Hypothesis 1 c: Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed if troops are equipped
with or deploy heavy, instead of small, weapons.
In the cold war era, major powers were debarred from participating in
peacekeeping missions to guarantee neutrality of UN forces. However, with a paradigm
shift to robust peacekeeping, it has become imperative that the well-resourced and trained
troops of the developed countries participate in UN peacekeeping missions (Bratt 1997;
Ong Heng 2003; Guehenno 2005). Diehl (1994), however, observes that super powers
have relatively minor impacts on the peacekeeping outcomes. Bratt (1997) on the other
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hand argues that successful mission in an internal conflict demands the support of the five
members of the Security Council because they possess great influence over the cost of
operations. Ong Heng (2003) also argues that multinational forces with the participation
of troops from the developed countries truly reflect collective responsibility and provide
robustness.
The basic logic is that major power participation reflects the legitimacy and
seriousness of global concern of the conflict. Additionally, the developed countries have
the critical resources both human and material that a credible deterrent UN peacekeeping
force needs. They also have the political and economic leverages to influence the
behavior of combatants by manipulating and raising the costs of continued fighting
(Regan 1996). The realization that the world community, especially super powers,
supports an intervention may exert pressure on protagonists to halt hostilities (Diehl et al.
1996)
Hypothesis 1 d: Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed when major power(s)
participate in the peacekeeping operation.
Control Variables
Scholars have argued and supported with case studies that language and cultural
differences among peacekeeping forces hinder operational effectiveness and may have
negative consequences on mission success (Eron et al. 1999; Duffey 2000). Cultural and
linguistic differences may result in disagreement in interpretation of mission resolutions
and what actions to take which may delay actions including the protection of civilians
under imminent threat. It is presumed that each country is distinct culturally.
Hypothesis 2:

The greater the number of countries contributing to the mission
contingents, the less likely the mission success.
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One perspective claim is that peacekeeping forces are most likely to succeed if
they are from the same region as the conflict. The argument is that affinity creates trust
and legitimacy (Diehl 1994). This claim has been supported by the Brahimi Report that
recommended regionalism as a better model measure of responding to a contemporary
international security threat. An opposite perspective is that regional peacekeepers are
less likely to be regarded as neutral and trustworthy (Diehl et al. 1996). I use as a proxy
the ethnicity of the highest field executive in determining whether the group affiliates
ethnically or culturally with the parties to the conflict or not. The reason is that the tenor
of the mission can be heavily influenced by the character and ability of the leadership.
Hypothesis 3: Peacekeeping missions are more likely to succeed if the highest field
executive plus troop contingents have cultural or ethnic affinity with the host country.
Many studies on conflicts have suggested that identity conflicts (ethnic or
religious) are far more difficult to resolve than ideological conflicts (Lake and Rothchild
1996). Identity conflicts are based on deep-rooted emotional values that are difficult to
compromise on. On the basis of this realization, it presupposes that casualties will be
more difficult to be controlled in identity conflicts than in ideological conflicts.
Hypothesis 4: Mission is less likely to be successful in identity conflicts than in
ideological conflicts.
Some studies argue that neighboring states have the potential to disrupt a
peacekeeping process with direct acts of violence or support warring parties that oppose
the operation (Green et al. 1998). Neighboring states have a high stake in the outcome of
conflicts and consequently act to either support or disrupt peaceful solutions. It is
therefore anticipated that more borders will negatively affect peacekeeping success.
Hypothesis 5: Countries with more bordering states see less peacekeeping success.
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A major finding in peace literature is that the probability of peacekeeping success
will be higher when there is a negotiated settlement to the conflict before peacekeepers
are deployed than the absence of such agreement (Fortna 1998). Fortna (1998) argues
that agreements employ several instruments to change the payoffs and make it costly to
cheat, reduce uncertainty about compliance and intentions, and control accidents. Signing
a peace agreement reflects the political will of the combatants to end the violent phase of
the conflict (Regan 2000; Downs and Stedman 2002).
Hypothesis 6: Missions are more likely to be successful when deployed after peace
agreements among conflict parties.
Another major finding in the international relations literature is that democracies
tend not to fight one another. This democratic peace proposition has more recently been
extended to civil wars (Hegre, Ellingsen, Gates and Gleditsch 2001), human rights
(Davenport 1999; Bueno De Mesquita et al. 2005), and state-sponsored mass-murder
(Rummel 1994, Easterly et al. 2006). Rummel (1994) finds, and confirmed by Easterly et
al. (2005), that democracies have killed substantially fewer of their own citizens than
other forms of governments.
Hypothesis 7: Mission success is likely to be greater when host states are democracies.
Research Design
In this study, I examine all intrastate peacekeeping missions in civil wars for the
period 1956-2006. The data was created using multiple sources. In this study, there are
240 observations in the dataset covering 46 intrastate conflicts in 29 countries. In order
to identify an event, a mission has to be deployed a in civil war during the period of
observation in accordance with the Uppsala Conflict Data Program definition of armed
conflict: an incompatibility (over either governmental power or territory, or both)
Volume 18, Number 2
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between a government and one or more irregular groups that in one year result in at least
25 battle-related deaths (Wallensteen and Sollenberg 2001). This threshold for inclusion
is lower than in many studies of civil war that require 1000 battle deaths a year (e.g.
Regan 2000; Singer and Small 1963), and also allows for a study of violence against
civilians in low intensity conflicts.
The unit of analysis is mission year. In order to test the hypotheses, I employed a
negative binomial and logit model regression models. Negative binomial regression
model determines the effect of robust peacekeeping on the levels of intentional civilian
killings while logit regression model determines either decreased or increased civilian
killings or mission success or failure.
Dependent Variable
Civilian Killing: The dependent variable is the number of civilians deliberately
killed. Following Valentino et al. (2004), civilian is defined as ―
any unarmed individual
who is not a member of a professional or guerrilla military group and who does not
actively participate in hostilities by intending to cause harm to enemy personnel or
property‖ (Valentino et al. 2004, 8). Civilian Killing is a count of the number of civilians
deliberately killed by either the government of a state or by formally organized non-state
groups which results in at least 25 deaths in a year based on the Uppsala Conflict Data
Program (UCDP) one-sided violence dataset. The program defines one-sided violence as
the use of armed force by the government of a state or by a formally organized group
against civilians which results in at least 25 deaths. The UCDP, however, does not cover
all my cases so I supplemented with data from United States Department of State annual
country reports on human rights practices and Human Rights Watch annual reports by
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country. Only deliberate killings through the use of force are coded, which means that
civilians killed in crossfire are excluded. Furthermore, indirect killings such as starvation
of conflict areas are also excluded.
Civkchang: This variable refers to change in civilian killings either decreased or
increased civilian killings to determine mission success or failure. This is a binary or
dichotomous variable and is coded as 0=decreased civilian killings (mission success), 1=
increased civilian killings (mission failure).
Independent Variables
Mission type refers to the types of UN peacekeeping missions launched into
conflict zones that includes observer, traditional, multi-dimensional and ‗robust‘
peacekeeping missions. The type of mission is coded in the following manner:
1 = Observer mission
2 = Traditional mission
3 = Multi-dimensional mission
4=―
Robust‖ mission
Data for mission type is from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation‘s website.
Mission strength/size is measured by the total manpower of the peacekeeping
mission. Data for mission strength is from the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operation‘s website. Rules of engagement is conceptualized as directives issued by a
competent military authority that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which
forces will initiate and /or combat engagement with other forces encountered (US
Chairman of the Joint of Chiefs of Staff Instruction, 2000). I measure rules of
engagement by the provisions in the mandate on conditions for use of force. Data is from
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the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation‘s website. Rules of engagement is coded
1 when mission force is permissible to use force to defend civilians from attacks;
otherwise it is coded 0 when mission force is not permissible to use force to defend
civilians from attacks but used only in self-defense.
Arms types, according to the United Nations weapon classifications, small arms
or light weapons are conventional weapons that can be carried by a soldier or on a light
vehicle. Small arms thus include revolvers and self-loading pistols, grenade, submachine
guns, rifles, machine guns, mines and antitank weapons. Heavy weapons are the major
conventional arms that include battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery systems,
combat aircraft, attack helicopters. Arms type data sources are the UN Register of
Conventional Arms and SIPRI arms database. Small arms is coded 0 while large or
heavy arms is coded 1. Major power is measured by the participation of any of the five
permanent members of the Security Council in a peacekeeping mission. It is coded as 0
when no major power participates and 1 when at least one major power participates. Data
for major power participation is from the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation‘s
website.
Control Variables:
Field executive affinity is a proxy for the cultural similarity between the mission
and host country. Affinity between the field executive (e.g. the force commander) is
measured using Vanhanen (1999) categorization of Caucasoid, Negroid, and Mongoloid.
The source of data is the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operation‘s website. Data on
ethnic composition of countries are from CIA world Factbook 2000 and Encyclopedia
Britannica, while Cavalli-Sforza (1991) determines which of the three main categories –
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Caucasoid, Negroid and Mongoloid—to which ethnic groups belonged. Host country and
country of origin of field executive are identified from mission reports of the Secretary
General, UN Peacekeeping Operations‘ website. Field executive affinity is coded as 0
when there is no affinity and 1 when there is an affinity. Conflict type distinguishes
identity conflict from ideological and revolutionary conflicts. The distinction is based on
the coding rule of Regan (2002). The type of conflict is coded as 0 when ideological,
revolutionary conflict and 1 for identity (ethnic or religious) conflict.
Border is operationalized in terms of either a shared border or less than 150 miles
of water separating two contiguous land masses based on the measures used by the
Correlates of War (COW) dataset (Singer and Small 1994). The number of borders is
measured as a continuous variable that ranges from a low of one border to a high of nine
borders. Peace agreement is denoted by a dummy variable indicating whether a peace
agreement is signed or not by all principal combatants before peacekeepers are deployed.
The data for the presence of peace agreement are from the peace-building dataset created
by Doyle and Sambanis (2000) or UN documents pertaining to the conflicts. The variable
is coded 0 for absence of peace agreement before deployment and 1 for presence of peace
agreement before deployment. Regime type refers to either democracy or autocracy of the
host country. Source of data for this variable is the combined policy score collected in the
Polity IV data (Marshall and Jaggers 2002). The democracy and autocracy scores are
each ordinally scaled, ranging from zero to ten, each measuring institutional aspects of
the regime. The regime type score therefore, ranges from -10 to 10. Following Valentino
et al. (2000), this variable is coded as a dummy variable: 0 = if the combined Polity score
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was less than + 6 (less democratic); 1 = if the combined Polity score was equal to or
greater than +6 (highly democratic).
Methodological Justification
The stated hypotheses were tested, using two different statistical models—
negative binomial and logit regression models. The dependent variable civilian killing is
the annual count of the number of civilians deliberately killed by the conflict parties
during the period of deployment of the mission force. Accordingly, I use event count
model rather than the more familiar linear regression model. In a recent study, Valentino
et al. (2004) used Ordinary Least Squared (OLS) analysis for civilian killing, while a
study by Eck and Hultman (2007) employed negative binominal regression analysis for
one-side civilian killing. Both studies show some disagreement about the choice of
methodological models for event count (see King 1989a). According to King (1989a),
OLS provides an unbiased linear estimator, and this is unaffected by different
distributional assumptions but identifies certain problems in using OLS (King 1989a).
First OLS assumes a linear relationship. This is an implausible functional model because
often it results in predicted events counts that are less than zero and therefore
meaningless. Second, OLS does not take into account neither heteroskedasticity nor the
underlying Poisson distribution of the disturbances hence OLS does not use all available
information in the estimation. King (1989a) and Long (1997) suggest that linear
regression models may result in outcomes with inconsistent, biased, and inefficient
estimates. These statistical problems of OLS could result in substantively biased
conclusions rendering OLS a statistically inefficient model for event count.
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The most common event count model, Poisson regression, determines the
probability of an event count based on Poisson distribution (Long 1997). Unfortunately,
Poisson regression models may bias standard errors downward, leading to inaccurate
assumptions about the level of significance of independent variables. In addition, Poisson
regression also assumes that the mean distribution is equal to the variance making the
resulting parameter estimates inefficient when a researcher suspects over-dispersion
(Long 1997). Over-dispersion or variance greater than the mean is quite likely in political
science research (King 1989b).
Given that the dependent variable is a count of civilians killed, the hypotheses are
tested applying negative binomial model (NBRM) as used by Eck and Hultman (2007).
An alternative approach to NBRM will be Gamma count model (see Alt et al. 2000). A
negative binomial regression model (NBRM) is suitable because it is preferred when
there is over-dispersion in the data which indicates that there might be both contagion and
unobserved heterogeneity (King 1989a, 129; Long 1997, 30-36). Apart from unobserved
heterogeneity and contagion, which are defined through the over-dispersion in the data,
there are also many zeros, and NBRM predicts a higher number of zeros (Eck and
Hultman 2007; Krause et al. 2006). This seems reasonable since there may be
fluctuations in civilian killings during the mission period. Within a mission year, there
may be civilian killings while in other years there may be no killings.. To determine
either mission success or failure I employ logit regression model given that the dependent
variable is dichotomous. I turn now to my findings.
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Findings
Descriptive Statistics
For the period 1956 to 2006 that this study covers, the United Nations deployed
46 missions in 29 civil conflicts. Ultimately, the United Nations engaged in 240 mission
years during the period under study. The data depict that within the period of study, the
percentage of mission years for the mission types are: observer, 33 percent; traditional,
28.3 percent; multi-dimensional, 18.3 percent; and robust, 20 percent (see Table 1 for
percentage of mission years). In my estimation, the lowest number of civilians
intentionally killed by conflict parties in a given year was 25 with 500,000 as the highest
recorded in the Rwandan genocide. The data depict that 97.7 percent of civilian killings
occurred during traditional peacekeeping missions including observer missions,
traditional, and multi-dimensional peacekeeping, while robust peacekeeping registers
only 1.3 percent of civilian killings (see Table 2).
Table 1. Percentage Years of UN mission types 1956-2006
Mission type
Number of mission years
(percentage)
Observer mission peacekeeping
80 (33.3%)
Traditional peacekeeping
68 (28.3%)
Multi-dimensional peacekeeping
44 (18.3%)
Robust peacekeeping
48 (20%)
240 (100%)
Total
Table 2. Percentage intentional civilian killings of UN mission types 1956-2006
Mission type
Civilian killings (percentage)
Observer mission peacekeeping
3916 (.7%)
Traditional peacekeeping
501923 (95%)
Multi-dimensional peacekeeping
11161(2%)
Robust peacekeeping
7073 (1.3%)
524073 (100%)
Total
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Statistical Results
Table 3 presents the results of the negative binomial models of intentional civilian
killings in United Nations Missions in civil wars between 1956 and 2006. Model 1 tests
our basic hypothesis excluding the control variables. In order to test the robustness of the
model, Model 2 contains all relevant control variables.
Looking at the results of model 1 in Table 3, our core hypothesis that robust
peacekeeping is more likely to be associated with lower number of civilian killings is
supported. The variable robust peacekeeping has a negative and statistically significant
association with the number of civilian killings meaning robust peacekeeping missions
may be more successful in lowering the number of deliberate civilian killings by conflict
parties in civil conflicts. The mission strength variable also has a negative and
statistically significant relation to the number of civilian killings confirming hypothesis
1b. This implies that large force strength is associated with lower levels of the number of
civilian killings. This could mean that such forces shorten the wars, or protect the
populations more effectively, or intervene in wars that have low casualty rates to begin
with. Interestingly enough and contrary to expectation, however, major power
participation has a positive and statistically significant relationship to the number of
civilian killings at least under model 1, implying that major power participation in UN
peacekeeping operations is more likely to be associated with higher numbers of civilian
deaths tending to disconfirm hypothesis 1 d. Similarly, the rules of engagement variable
has a positive and statistically significant effect in model 1 indicating that deliberate
civilian killings are likely to be higher when the peacekeeping mandate permits mission
forces to use force other than for self defense disconfirming hypothesis 1 a.
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Table 3. Negative binomial regression models of intentional civilian killings in
United Nations Missions in civil wars, 1956-2006
Model 1
Coefficients of the number
of intentional civilian
killings (standard errors)
-2.287 ** (0.922)
-0.140 *** (0.030)

Model 2
Coefficients of the number
of intentional civilian
killings (standard errors)
1.166 (0.831)
-.200*** (0.032)

Robust peacekeeping
Mission strength (1000
people)
Resources (in US$1000)
4.860
(6.140)
3.850 (3.110)
Major power participation
4.223*** (1.054)
0.209 (0.726)
Rules of engagement
1.020** (0.300)
-1.106 (2.528)
Ethnic affinity
-0.081 (0.702)
Identity conflict
4.280** (1.352)
Borders
0.407 (0.393)
Democracy
0.151 (0.750)
Troops composition
0.057** (0.023)
Constant
4.100*** (0.256)
1.415 (1.558)
Number of observation
197
144
Log pseudo-likelihood
-870.573
-724.046
Wald chi 2
30.01
96.92
Prob > ch2
0.000
0.000
Estimations performed using Stata 9. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses (adjusted
for clustering on missions). *p < 0 .1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 All tests are two-tailed

Turning to the results in model 2 that includes the control variables, we first
notice that mission type itself is no longer negatively and significantly related to casualty
levels, while mission strength as in model 1 has a negative and statistically significant
relationship with civilian killings further confirming hypothesis 1 b. It could be, then, that
particular aspect of robust deployments (such as size of force levels) rather than the
designation of mission themselves, play a key role in dampening human rights abuses.
The findings also support the argument in the deterrent model that large troop
deployments increase the costs of continued fighting for combatants and thereby reduce
civilian killings. This is possible since a large force can effectively monitor a large area
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and pose a formidable deterrent to spoilers. However, none of our other core variables
had significant effects on the number of civilian killings. Major power participation has
positive links to civilian killings but not statistically significant ones.
Examining the control variables, identity conflict has a positive and significant
effect on civilian killings tending to confirm hypothesis 4. Thus, identity conflicts are
more likely to be associated with higher numbers of civilians killed during internal
conflicts than are ideological forms of dispute. The latter point supports the argument that
identity conflicts are so much based on deep-rooted emotional values that combatants
find it difficult to compromise on those underlying issues and restrain forces. In view of
this realization, war becomes the most viable mechanism of the pursuit of group
objectives. It therefore presupposes that casualties will be more difficult to control in
identity conflicts than in ideological conflicts similar to the Rwandan genocide.
Peacekeeping contingent composition also is positively and significantly related to
civilian killings confirming hypothesis 2. This finding is in line with the argument that
the more the mission force comprises many culturally diverse contingents, the less likely
the mission success because cultural differences among peacekeeping forces may result
in disagreement in interpretation of the resolution and what actions to take (Eron et al.
1999; Duffey 2000). Such disagreements on the interpretation of the resolution and rules
of engagement may delay or prevent actions to protect civilians. For example, during the
UNAMSIL operation in Sierra Leone, the disagreement between the Indian command
and Nigerian contingents paralyzed the mission and adversely affected to some extent the
mission‘s operational efficiency (Bullion 2001, 78). All the other control variables have
no significant effect on civilian killings. Peace agreement dropped due to collinearity.
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Table 4 presents marginal effects of statistically significant variables of the
negative binomial model on civilian killings in United Nations peacekeeping missions in
civil conflicts from 1956 to 2006. Coefficients of negative binomial regression model
give us odd values. In order to understand the actual impact of each coefficient, we need
to compute the substantive value of each coefficient of the significant variable. These
marginal effects offer us more substantive insight into the extent to which robust
peacekeeping, mission strength, the use of force, major power participation, identity
conflict and troops composition influence civilian killings during the period under
investigation.
According to model 1, with robust peacekeeping, about 1442 fewer numbers of
civilians are killed per year. In respect to mission strength, I found that an increase in the
mission strength by one standard deviation from the mean lowers the number of
intentional civilian killings by 142 per year. Considering other factors, I found that
conflict parties kill 1611 more civilians per year with major power participation in UN
missions in civil conflicts. Furthermore, I found that 1681 more civilians‘ deaths per year
occur when the mandate permits UN mission forces to use force for purposes other than
self defense only. These findings might give pause to easy assumptions that involving
major powers is a reliable way to stabilize local violence or that broad latitude in use of
force by peacekeepers is reliable for purposes of civilian protection.
In respect to model 2 that included our control variables, I did not find these latter
cautionary effects, and I found that an increase in the mission strength by one standard
deviation from the mean lowers the number of intentional civilian killings by 32 per year.
Considering other factors, I found that in identity conflicts, 4240 more civilians‘ deaths
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per year can be expected than in other forms of conflict. In terms of troops‘ composition,
I found that an increase in troop diversity by one standard deviation from the mean,
results in roughly 10 more civilian deaths per year.

Table 4. Marginal Effects of statistically significant variables on intentional civilian
killings in UN Missions in civil conflicts, 1956- 2006
Model 1
Model 2
Approximate change in Approximate change
the number of
in the number of
intentional civilian
intentional civilian
killings
killings
Robust peacekeeping
-1442
Mission strength (1000s)
-142
-32.2
Major power participation
1611
Rules of engagement that permits
1681
the use of force other than self
defense only
Identity conflict (ethnic and
4240
religious )
Troops composition comprising
10
many culturally diverse contingents
Marginal effects are computed with the coefficient from the negative binomial regression
models presented in table 2. The values of selected statistically significant variables
changed while holding all others constant at their means or modes.
Table 5 presents the results of logit regression model for our binary dependent variable
‖ for mission success or reduced deliberate civilian
change in civilian killings coded as ―0
killings and ―
1‖ for mission failure or increased deliberate civilian killings. Robust
peacekeeping has a negative and significant relation to civilian killings suggesting that
robust peacekeeping lowers civilian killings in line with the findings in model 1 Table 3
and again confirming the core hypothesis 1. The rest of the independent variables,
however, appear to have no significant impact on civilian killings. Turning to the control
variables, conflict type, troops‘ composition, ethnic affinity with the host state and
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democracy have positive and significant ties to civilian killings. In other words identity
conflicts and culturally diverse troop contingents and even somewhat democratic states
are more associated with civilian killings confirming some of our earlier findings in
model 2 Table 3.
Ethnic affinity of the mission force presents a very interesting finding. The results
show that the forces‘ affinity with the conflict state may increase civilian killings defying
the basic argument for regionalism as a better mechanism for peace operations. Since the
mission force share the same culture with the conflict parties, they may have interest in
the conflict thereby compromising the principle of impartiality and hurting a party to the
conflict, ultimately obstructing the peace process. Also, the cultural bond between the
mission force and conflict parties, along with concerns about being accused of partiality,
may hinder the mission force undertaking certain stringent measures against spoilers of
the peace process.
Finally, contrary to expectation, the finding suggests that democracies are
associated with more civilian killings. This finding however might confirm the Davenport
and Armstrong (2004) discovery that there is a threshold of democratic peace and that
lower levels of democracy or transitional democracies are associated with human rights
violations (Davenport and Armstrong 2004, 551).
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Table 5. Logit regression model of intentional civilian killings in United Nations
Missions in Civil Wars, 1956-2006
Coefficients of change in the number of
intentional civilian killings (standard
errors)
Robust peacekeeping
-2.088*** (0.594)
Major power participation
-1.157 (0.594)
Mission strength(1000)
0.000 (0.000)
Resources( US$1000)
7.850 ( 7.790)
Identity conflict
2.164**(0.844)
Borders
0.135 (0.388)
Troops composition
0.054** (0.027)
Ethnic affinity
1.520*(0.781)
Democracy
1.435** (0.727)
Constant
1.99217 (1.4501)
Number of observation
102
Log pseudo-likelihood
-45.702813
Pseudo R2
0.2704
Estimations performed using Stata 9. Robust Standard errors are in parentheses (adjusted
for clustering on missions). *p < 0 .1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 All tests are two-tailed.
Table 6 presents marginal effects of statistically significant variables on civilian
killings of the logit model. Here we see that, robust peacekeeping decreases civilian
killings by about 31 percent per year. In respect to the control variables, I found that
democracies increase civilian killings by 29 percent per year and an increase in troops‘
diversity by one standard deviation from the mean increases civilian killings by 10
percent per year. Finally, I found that identity conflicts increase civilian killings by 40
percent per year and ethnic similarity to host state also increases civilian killings by 24
percent per year.
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Table 6. Marginal Effects of statistically significant variables on intentional civilian
killings in UN Missions in civil conflicts, 1956- 2006
Approximate percentage change of
probabilities of intentional civilian killings
Robust peacekeeping
-0.31(31%)
Democracy
0.29 (29%)
Troops composition
0.01 (10%
Identity conflict
0.40 (40%)
Ethnic affinity
0.24(24%)

Conclusion
The empirical results presented in this study support the core argument that robust
peacekeeping works better than traditional peacekeeping in reducing civilian killings.
This finding provides strong support for the theory that a large robust United Nations
force deters spoilers from killing civilians. However, the related notions of major
involvement and more militarily forceful missions do not appear to restrain killing and in
fact are associated with higher civilian casualties. A unique finding is the contribution of
large strength to mission success. This resonates with the Brahimi Report‘s
recommendation for large troop size for mission success because large troops may
occupy large area effectively monitoring and implementing mission mandate (United
Nations, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 2000 ). The findings
further inform us of the severity of identity conflicts and confirm the argument that
highly culturally diverse peacekeeping forces can derail mandate implementation as in
the UNAMSIL experience in Sierra Leone (Bullion 2001). The finding that regional
cultural similarity results in mission failures is striking since it defies the popular
assumption by UN policy makers that regionalism is the better option for international
security due to forces‘ similarity with neighbors. We also observe that borders matter and
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countries bordered by many states may be prone to increased civilian killings in civil war
situations. It was also found that at least proto-democratic status of the host state appear
to be harbinger of potentially higher deliberate civilian killing total. The findings thus
have both theoretical and policy implications in the field of peacekeeping.
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